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 At present in the United States, the American people are questioning many of the 
criminal justice institutions which have existed for as long as our relatively young nation. Are 
laws which prohibit the use of recreational drugs or (consensual) prostitution reasonable, let 
alone necessary, and if so, do these types of crimes merit prison sentences? Who is harmed by 
these actions, and if no harm is perpetrated, why do these actions require a response of 
retributive punishment? If no one is harmed, how can punishment claim proportionality to the 
offense? These questions, at face, seem to generate a fair amount of skepticism toward the 
backwards and unnecessary laws which are increasing in prevalence at an exponential rate; 
however, more paradigmatic questions arise from this discussion of flawed laws and regulations: 
what does punishment offer that other schemes of criminal justice cannot?  
David Boonin’s theory of pure restitution asserts that punishment is morally unjustifiable, 
and that if pure restitution is capable of replacing punishment there is no reason to keep it 
(punishment). From this, it can be inferred that, in Boonin’s view, pure restitution is superior to 
punishment in the scope of its offerings, and can be morally justified. If we consider the victim 
of a thief- caught, tried, and convicted- pure restitution seems to gain even more traction: 
currently (in punishment), the victim is never made whole again- nor partially so; in pure 
restitution, the victim is made whole again- to the highest degree possible, by the offender’s own 
bidding. The mere presence of a comprehensive alternative to punishment gives rise to questions 
which can no longer be avoided: when an offender harms a victim, is the victim second party to 
the state? In the body that follows, I will examine the offerings and moral justifiability of 




II. What is Punishment? Restitution? 
 How, exactly, can punishment be abolished, while preserving society’s relatively 
predictable processes and functions? In a modern society- at the very least- there must be 
ramifications for acting against reasonable and just laws, else there remains no reason to respect 
their force or binding nature. While this assertion is hardly questionable, a deeper question must 
be raised: why does the fact that a person breaks a just and reasonable law make it morally 
permissible1 for the state to treat him in such a way that would otherwise be impermissible?2 
Why is it okay for the state to treat one group of its citizens in a way that it would not treat 
another, appealing to nothing but the nature of the difference as justification for doing so? This 
sort of justification has been rejected by our government in various forms, including restrictions 
on same-sex marriage, as well as Jim Crow laws; although these distinctions are substantially 
different from punishing an individual for choosing to violate a law- the former are personal 
traits which cannot be chosen or changed (realistically)- does it necessarily change the result? I, 
personally, am inclined to think otherwise- whilst applying to law school, students attending less 
prestigious undergraduate institutions, maintaining equivalent LSAT scores and GPAs to more 
prestigious institution-attending counterparts are often treated unfavorably simply because of 
their choice of degree-granting institution. If these students are capable of demonstrating their 
academic merits (by having an LSAT score and GPA in line with or higher than applicants from 
more prestigious institutions), they should not be treated unfavorably for the sole reason of their 
choice of undergraduate institution.3 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that since using the 
nature of the difference between two groups as justification to treat one group differently from 
                                                
1 I acknowledge the other justifications for punishment- retributivism, deterrence, and others. The focus of 
this paper, however, is the morally involved aspects of punishment. Arguments may be advanced from retributivism, 
deterrence, etc., but these arguments must “bite the bullet” of moral unjustifiability. 
2 David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 213. 
3 Please admit me, Vanderbilt. 
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the other is demonstrably insufficient to warrant continuing doing so, there must be some other 
independent and morally justifiable argument to warrant punishment. 
Before distinctions between punishment and restitution can be made, there are a number 
of terms whose specific meanings must be clarified. Given this will be a defense of Boonin’s 
theory of pure restitution, it is only appropriate to remain loyal to his characterizations of 
“punishment” and “pure restitution”. For the remainder of this paper, “punishment” (which will 
be understood as “legal punishment”) and “pure restitution” will be used solely in the context 
discussed in the body immediately below. Boonin offers two nearly identical definitions of 
punishment, of which- for the sake of appeasing criticism- I have elected to use the weaker, 
which proceeds in the following manner:  
P’s act a is a legal punishment of Q for offense o if and only if (1) P is a legally 
authorized official acting in his or her official capacity and (2) P does a because P 
believes (perhaps mistakenly) that Q has committed o and (3) P does a with the intent of 
harming Q (even if P fails to actually harm Q) and (4) P’s doing of a expresses official 
disapproval of Q for having committed o.4 
Boonin’s definition of punishment characterizes the harm it [punishment] is expected to cause as 
necessarily intentional, as opposed to foreseeable harm that is merely left uninterrupted. In 
formulating this, as well as the other possible definition for [legal] punishment, Boonin addresses 
a number of potential objections to the use of particular diction. Since Boonin’s 
counterarguments to these objections are sufficient, the objections will not be addressed in the 
scope of this paper; my concerns rest solely upon the determination of whether Boonin’s theory 
of pure restitution is a justifiable, superior, and practical alternative to punishment, in the context 
of the American criminal justice system. 
                                                
4 Ibid., 25. 
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 It is pertinent, now, to outline Boonin’s theory of pure restitution. However, before doing 
so, it will be beneficial to characterize and distinguish “pure restitution” from “punitive 
restitution”. Randy Barnett, whose paper, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice” 
provided the foundation of Boonin’s more robust theory, provides a straightforward distinction 
between the two types of restitution: “Punitive restitution is an attempt to gain the benefits of 
pure restitution… while retaining the perceived advantages of the paradigm of punishment.5 
Where punitive restitution is restitution “in addition to” punishment, pure restitution is 
restitution itself and nothing more:6 
We can therefore summarize the theory of pure restitution as follows: if an offender is 
responsible for having wrongfully harmed a victim, then (a) the state should compel the 
offender to restore the victim to the level of well-being that the victim rightfully enjoyed 
prior to the offense and (b) the state should not punish the offender.7 
In Boonin’s definition of the theory, the words ‘harm’, ‘wrongfully’, ‘restore’, and ‘rightfully’ 
are subject to further clarification- ‘harm’ is to be understood as making a victim worse off than 
they would have been, had the act not occurred; ‘wrongfully’, as prohibited by a just and 
reasonable law; ‘restore’, as in to the exact state enjoyed prior, (but where this is not possible, 
restoration to the level of well-being previously enjoyed will suffice); ‘rightfully’, as the victim’s 
enjoyment was protected by a just and reasonable law.8 I have omitted ‘responsible’ from these 
terms which required further definition, as I intend to discuss it at greater length later in this 
paper. There is insight into a fair few things from these clarifications, including that pure 
restitution is not necessarily monetary, nor does it protect any individual’s enjoyment of illegally 
acquired objects or benefits- the theory of pure restitution does not protect a car thief’s 
                                                
5 Randy Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice," Ethics 87, no. 4 (1977): 490. 
6 Barnett distinguishes between punitive and pure restitution; I am interested only in the characteristics of 
pure restitution. 
7 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 224. 
8 Ibid., 221-4. 
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enjoyment of a car, which was acquired by stealing, if it came to be in the thief’s possession 
through unlawful means (whether stolen directly, or acquired by exploiting other stolen goods). 
In the following sections, I will discuss the key differences between pure restitution and 
punishment as well as the most infamous objections to Boonin’s pure restitution, before 
furthering an argument for restitution which stifles those common objections attempting to 
undermine pure restitution. 
III. Key Differences of Punishment and Pure Restitution 
 While most of the differences between punishment and pure restitution are entirely 
apparent and of little consequence to discussion, some of the most core differences are those 
more subtly distinct. The most significant distinction to be made between the two is in their 
situation of harm- in punishment harm must be intended, whereas in pure restitution, where it 
may be supposed that harm is incompatible with the theory, harm is permissible because it is not 
intended. The goal of punishment is to make an offender suffer (harm) for violating a reasonable 
and just law. The goal is achieved through numerous methods, which may even include 
restitution; however, if in the course of extracting compensation for a victim – who rightfully 
enjoyed the status from which they were removed (made worse off) - wrongfully harmed by an 
offender, the state’s goal does not include harming the offender, but simply returning the victim 
to the state they rightfully enjoyed before the offense. If the state does not intend to harm the 
offender, then it cannot be argued that the state- by causing harm to the offender, as a result of 
being compelled to make restitution- punishes the offender.  
 Another distinction between punishment and pure restitution is the entity “offended” by 
crimes- in punishment, when a crime is committed, that crime is against the state. The state, 
whether in the context of a town, city, county, or actual state is, at its core, society. When one 
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individual is robbed at gunpoint, on the paradigm of punishment, society as a whole is 
perpetrated upon. Contrarily, in the theory of pure restitution, when an offender commits a crime 
against an individual, the only ‘victim’- by default- is the individual whose well-being was 
wrongfully damaged, while other individuals harmed by the offender’s actions may be entitled to 
compensation. There are several objections stemming from the idea of “secondary victims”, 
which I will discuss in greater depth in the portion of this paper dedicated to objections; for now, 
however, I must digress. 
One of the largest differences between punishment and pure restitution is not merely a 
theoretical problem, but an illustratable practical concern. I wish to draw attention to the massive 
inequality between what punishment and pure restitution are capable of offering their victims, 
illuminated by Murray Rothbard:  
What happens nowadays is the following absurdity: A steals $15,000 from B. The 
government tracks down, tries, and convicts A, all at the expense of B, as one of the 
numerous taxpayers… Then, the government, instead of forcing A to repay B or to work 
at forced labor until the debt is paid, forces B, the victim to pay taxes to support the 
criminal in prison for ten or twenty years’ time. […]. The victim not only loses his 
money, but pays more money besides for the dubious thrill of catching, convicting, and 
then supporting the criminal; […].9 
In punishment, everyone is made worse off, no one is “bettered”- the real victim never sees a 
dime of compensation, nor is the offender made to reflect upon or address- in any meaningful 
way- those factors which led to their imprisonment. It is unlikely that the frequency of crime in 
society will reduce (and ultimately disappear) when those individuals committing crimes are 
incapable of overcoming the socioeconomic and political ramifications which cripple their 
economic opportunities to a degree so high that recidivism is unavoidable: the offender sits in a 
cell for a decade- after which it is impossible for him to find legitimate work capable of 
                                                
9 Murray Rothbard qtd. in Kelse Moen, “A Choice in Criminal Law: Victims, Defendants, and the Option 
of Restitution.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 22, iss. 3 (2013): 5. 
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supporting himself, let alone a family (which many convicts have); so instead of learning 
valuable skills for reintegration to society (and the workforce that is unwilling to give him a job), 
he refines the skills of his craft, increasing the likelihood of his evasion in the future, since he’ll 
be forced to resort to crime to make money. If the function of punishment is, in fact, to reduce 
the amount of crime in society- by separating the criminals from the innocents, paying a “debt” 
to society- it fails tremendously. Pure restitution can provide compensation to the victim, so as to 
return them (as close as is possible) to the condition they enjoyed previously, but may also 
benefit the offender by assessing and addressing the circumstances which led to criminal 
behavior in the first place. Because of the flexibility restitution enjoys, there are nearly endless 
possibilities of what ‘form’ compensation can take, so scenarios in which neither the victim’s nor 
offender’s situation is improved should seldom occur. 
IV. The “Irreparable Harms” Objection 
 At first glance, there appears to be a number of objections this iteration of pure restitution 
cannot- if Boonin hopes it to replace punishment, as his theory suggests is possible- leave 
unanswered… nor offer sufficient responses to. Boonin addresses eleven of the most significant 
objections raised by critics in The Problem of Punishment, a number which has only grown 
larger; however, the most serious and potentially harmful objections are confined to a small 
collection of objections. Although I would prefer to address each of more than a dozen 
objections to the theory of pure restitution, I must narrow the scope of my discussion drastically- 
Boonin had a hundred pages to represent what I must in far fewer. For this reason, I will limit my 
discussion to the two objections with the greatest potential to damage the theory of pure 
restitution: the “irreparable harms” objection and the “third party victims” objection. I will begin 
with the “irreparable harms” objection. 
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The theory of pure restitution functions appropriately when it is possible to determine the 
cost of a harm- in most cases of theft or other like property crimes, this is an exceedingly simple 
task; precisely how the calculation is performed is irrelevant to this discussion. The critics of 
pure restitution, however, keenly point out the apparent problems crimes whose damages are not 
so easily repaired cause Boonin’s theory. To many critics, the suggestion that pure restitution 
could claim to truly repair the damage caused by crimes against the person, like murder or rape, 
is unacceptable. This perceived inability of the offender to repair the damage their victim 
suffered seems to allude to the supposition that 
if the harm cannot be repaired, then the state cannot do anything to the offender at all. An 
offender who causes reparable harm … on this account, might face serious consequences 
for his offense, but an offender who causes irreparable harm… would face none at all. 
And thus, again, the critic maintains that punishment is necessary.10 
The sentiments most apparent in this supposition seem to suggest that, as prescribed by the 
theory of pure restitution, in a case of rape or murder (or other irreparable harms), an offender 
would not face any consequences for their actions, and likewise, this lack of consequences is 
unacceptable (else, why would punishment be necessary?). The “irreparable harms” objection is 
confronted by two avenues- by rejecting the unacceptability of the lack (or apparent lack) of 
consequences, or by demonstrating the vulnerability of punishment to the same criticism. 
Boonin’s first response is most clear when framed analogously- consider a scenario in 
which there is a moral principle that states that “when a patient is dying, it is permissible to save 
her by transplanting an organ from a willing donor, but it is not permissible to save her by 
stealing an organ from an unwilling donor.” In this situation, the absence of a willing donor does 
not invalidate the principle, but demonstrates that the principle has conditions that must be met in 
                                                
10 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 235. 
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order to permissibly perform the procedure.11 Phrased alternatively, the theory of pure restitution 
claims that the state may compel restitution (doing so is morally justifiable, where punishment is 
not), not that it is required to do so. If the extraction of restitution is morally justifiable, it does 
not follow that restitution is possible to extract, in all instances. This is not an implication that 
will be accepted lightly, but the unpopularity of its factuality does not necessarily make it false.  
Suppose, however, that this response is insufficient in the eyes of critics of the theory; 
this second line of reasoning, by which the “irreparable harms” objection is disputed, proceeds 
by demonstrating that although- in some instances- the state is incapable of extracting restitution 
from offenders, the theory of pure restitution faces detriment no greater than the paradigm of 
punishment, therefore this is not reason enough to reject the theory. To illustrate how punishment 
would, in these circumstances, be vulnerable to the same pitfalls as pure restitution, Boonin 
offers another analogy: 
Suppose, for example, that Larry is dying of cancer. He has only a few days to live, and 
the quality of his life is so poor that he is indifferent between dying now and dying in a 
few days. Larry maliciously and savagely kills several of his nurses. […]. ...it is 
impossible for the state to do anything to him that will make him significantly worse off 
than he already is. As a result, in this case it is not possible for the state to punish an 
offender.12 
In these circumstances, it is clear that punishing Larry in any meaningful capacity is impossible; 
time constraints aside, there is simply nothing left for him to lose (that he isn’t losing in the 
immediate future). By the same logic proposed by the critics of the theory of pure restitution, the 
cases in which the state would be incapable of imposing punishment upon an offender would 
provide sufficient justification to reject punishment. The “irreparable harms” objection seems 
thoroughly dismissible as a potential reason to reject the theory of pure restitution; it has been 
                                                
11 Ibid., 236. 
12 Ibid., 236. 
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demonstrated that despite the inability of the state, in some scenarios, to extract restitution 
(‘adequate’) from offenders, it does not follow logically, nor has it been demonstrated by critics, 
that this inability is unacceptable. Furthermore, even if the critical assumption is granted- that it 
is, in fact, unacceptable- punishment fares no better on the “necessity” framework, as it is 
equally incapable of wholly repairing irreparable harms. For this reason, the irreparable harms 
objection is not sufficient to reject the theory of pure restitution. 
V. Intentions and the “Third Party Victims” Objection 
At this point, I would like to shift my attention to an objection with many iterations- the 
“third party victims” objection- some of which are contrived from strange assumptions about 
intentions, what the theory of pure restitution implies, and moral permissibility; other versions 
display a greater depth of understanding. Before examining various versions of this objection, 
however, I would like to engage in a brief discussion about intentions and why they are 
significant. 
 While acting in the most trivial of scenarios, it is fairly debatable as to whether our 
intentions matter or not. Then again, past a certain threshold, our reasons for doing things, 
whether entangled with the rule of law or not, matter. Troublesome implications sprout from the 
notion that our reasons for doing things don’t matter. Consider the following scenario: an 
ambulance driver and Billy both run a red light; the former does so in order to escort an 
individual in need of immediate medical attention to the hospital as rapidly as possible- else the 
individual will die, whereas Billy is in a hurry to get to the toy store, to pick up a birthday gift. 
To claim that the ambulance driver is no more justified than Billy, to run the light, is asinine on 
every conceivable level. To suggest this is to suggest that ambulance drivers must let people die, 
serial murderers be considered no more culpable than someone ‘responsible’ for a workplace 
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accident, and other nonsensical claims. Although it is true that both are interrupting the order of 
society, the ambulance driver is doing so for reasons which we, as a society, deem important 
enough to make exception for, whereas Billy’s actions undermine an “absolute value” of society 
in order to further a personal agenda (which is, I would argue, objectively of embarrassingly 
little consequence in comparison to the life of another human being). Certainly, it is a 
foreseeable possibility that the ambulance driver might cause harm to others by running the red 
light, but we would not suggest his actions were malicious, or that he ought to be held to the 
same degree of accountability as Billy; perhaps they would be accepted as an unfortunate by-
product of a morally justifiable action. Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
perfectly characterizes the critical nature of intentions: “even a dog distinguishes between being 
stumbled over and being kicked.”13 This illustration is sufficient, I think, to suggest that- at the 
very least- intentions do matter.  
 With this conception of intentions in mind, I move to address the “third party victims” 
objection.  One formulation of this objection hinges upon the assumption that extracting 
compensation from an offender usually causes harm to third parties. His objection to pure 
restitution proceeds, then, by arguing that [pure] restitution itself explicitly possesses a principle 
prohibiting the harm of non-offenders, and, by extension, that “the state should exact 
compensation from the criminal, and it would be wrong to exact compensation from the 
criminal,” thereby contradicting and invalidating itself.14 The argument produced by Jesper 
Ryberg continues by rejecting the immediate response to this objection: that the distinction 
between intent and foresight is sufficient to save the theory. Claiming that harm to “third parties” 
                                                
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Early Forms of Liability.” The Common Law. (1909). 
14 Jesper Ryberg, “Restitutionism: A Self-Defeating Theory of Criminal Justice.” Social Theory and 
Practice 38, no. 2. (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 2012), 289. 
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is merely a regrettable, yet foreseeable by-product, according to Ryberg, suggests that in any 
such case (of mere foreseeability) there exists no justification for extracting restitution. Ryberg 
goes as far to attribute the intentional/foreseeable distinction to the acts of the offender himself… 
incorrectly so. He argues that the offender could claim, in every case, that the harm caused to the 
victim was not intentional, but merely a foreseeable consequence, but this application is 
mistaken. In the presence of a just and reasonable law, the harmful acts caused by an offender 
upon a victim are not lessened/heightened by the offender’s reasons for doing so (except in cases 
of accepted/rejected excuses), but their culpability may be aggravated or diminished in 
accordance with their intentions. This relationship is apparent by considering those people held 
responsible for workplace accidents: they are still accountable for the end result, but usually to a 
lesser degree than we would hold a murderer whose (intentional) actions resulted in a similar 
outcome. Boonin’s iteration of pure restitution surely does not make mention to “third parties” or 
secondary victims, expressly, but must acknowledge that it clearly follows that intentionally 
inflicting harm to individuals- whether the offender or anyone else- is morally unjustifiable.  
Ryberg relies on an unrepresentative interpretation of Boonin’s definition for ‘harm’, 
which overlooks the fact that, when the state extracts restitution, the state is not, in doing so, 
subjecting itself to the first claim of the theory of pure restitution- (a)15, so long as the state does 
not break any just and reasonable laws in doing so. The state’s extracting compensation from the 
offender (if it is determined to be morally justifiable to do so, in accordance with the reasoning 
discussed in the “irreparable harms” objection) is not congruent to an offender wrongfully 
harming a victim. In the same way that the ambulance driver is justified in running the red light 
where Billy was not, the state is justified in extracting restitution- possibly harming the offender 
                                                
15 See pg. 5. 
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(as a foreseeable by-product, but not intentionally), where the offender was not (in the presence 
of a just and reasonable law) justified in harming the victim- intentionally or as a foreseeable by-
product. By the same reasoning, then, “third parties” in close relation to the offender, who are 
‘harmed’ by the state’s extraction of restitution, do not invoke the first claim of the theory of 
pure restitution- the state’s actions are morally justifiable, and neither “wrongful” nor a “harm”, 
since they (third party victims) are not ‘victim’ to the state’s ‘offense’; it is for this reason that 
the ambulance driver’s running a red light is not responded to in the same manner as Billy’s.  
Scott Gallagher, another critic of the theory of pure restitution, recognizes that Ryberg’s 
conclusion- that neither harming victims, nor “third parties” can be justified- is a massive 
overstep. The state’s harming “third parties” cannot be categorically dismissed as “unjustifiable”, 
though Gallagher asserts that determining the justifiability of the infliction of harm on “third 
parties” must be decided on the merits of each individual case.16 Although I agree that 
Gallagher’s assertion is in the correct general vicinity, it seems to be framed in an unnecessarily 
restrictive manner- the merits for determining the justifiability/unjustifiability of an infliction of 
harm carry no increased, nor decreased weight if the justifiability is assumed and unjustifiability 
is considered by merits instead. This criticism, if it could be called that, is miniscule in its 
intended goal, compared to those against Ryberg. This small distinction would have meaningful 
implications in application, since the victim would receive the benefit of the doubt (which seems 
appropriate, considering this is an element of pure restitution), much in the same way the 
accused is- “innocent until proven guilty”- in the current criminal justice system. This shift of 
burden seems acceptable since the offender is not at risk of being treated in a way that would be 
impermissible for a non-offender: ‘innocent’ people are required to pay restitution regularly in 
                                                
16 Scott Gallagher, “The Limits of Pure Restitution.” Social Theory and Practice 42, no. 1 (2016): 79. 
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society. Consequently, the assertion that pure restitution has been shown to be theoretically 
capable of implementation seems sufficiently justified.  
 
VI. Theoretical Limitations of Restitution 
 Now that pure restitution has been demonstrated to be theoretically implementable, a 
critical question is raised: are there negative implications to said implementation of pure 
restitution? Surely- the proposed paradigm shift is not without flaws… so what are they? This is 
by no means a comprehensive list of all the practical flaws of restitution, but I believe these 
illustrations will provide sufficient insight as to the categorical nature of many of these 
limitations. 
 Many of the limitations of pure restitution manifest out of intentional actions which we 
consider morally repulsive, but with no clear person as their victim. For example, animal cruelty 
is widely condemned, and although cruelty toward an owned animal- by an external party- can be 
easily dealt with17, animal cruelty inflicted upon pet by its owner poses a much more difficult 
question. Furthermore, restitution seems incapable of responding to animal cruelty against 
wild/ownerless animals, although a case could be made that society- as a whole- is harmed by 
such reviled acts (though this requires further elaboration).  
Yet another category of problematic scenarios arises when crimes against individuals are 
perpetrated by a government. There seems to be no way to compel a government to pay 
restitution, and even if there was, if tax dollars are spent on restitution, the government would 
                                                
17 I am implying that the pet would simply be treated as any other case of destroying/damaging another 
person’s property, though the nature of the animal as sentient and the disgust such an act might cause could be 
applied as aggravating factors toward the extent of the damage that be accountable for compensation. 
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not seem to be paying- the people would. It must be acknowledged that in most cases of criminal 
harms perpetrated against individuals (by the government), there is an individual or small group 
of individuals (or an organization) which specifically committed the harm; these individuals and 
organizations do have superiors/equals which could reasonably compel restitution.18  
These illustrations are only a few of the sorts of limitations worthy of discussion, but in 
both cases-and, I assert, in most (if not all)- a sensible resolution is reachable. With these 
examples in mind, I ask: are these limitations so unacceptable that restitution must be outright 
rejected? I suggest not; considering all the benefits pure restitution enjoys over punishment and 
the moral impermissibility of punishment, the small amount of reasoning required to sufficiently 
respond to the objectionable behaviors discussed above returns a massive improvement. 
VIII. Restitution Implemented 
 Considering the purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate not only the theoretical 
consistency of Boonin’s theory of pure restitution, but also the practical applicability of 
restitution in the U.S., it will be prudent to consider a possible real-world implementation, which 
includes a potential for the creation of the highly lucrative industry- “crime insurance/tax”. I will 
begin by laying out the features of such a society, and later discuss the benefits and potential 
pitfalls inherent in the iteration I consider.  
If restitution replaced punishment as the national standard of criminal justice, all costs 
associated with the housing of prisoners could be eliminated, as the number of incarcerated 
persons would be significantly lower- the circumstances necessary to confine an individual on 
the paradigm of restitution are few, and the cost of any individual incarceration could be paid by 
                                                
18 Whether personal capital or non-tax-related income from the organization as a whole/department. 
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said individual. Additionally, the costs associated with public defense might disappear or 
decrease significantly, as the reasoning for providing public counsel is tied to the potential loss 
of life or liberty; there is currently no right to counsel in civil suits (which are extraordinarily 
similar in outcome to those criminal cases in a paradigm of restitution) for this reason, and when 
the only potential consequence of crime is restitution, there seems to be little need for public 
counsel. Furthermore, there is the possibility for the creation of “crime insurance”, an optional 
service which consists in an independent entity (the agency) investigating the crime and filing 
the appropriate court complaint… potentially even litigating the case; in the event of a 
conviction, the agency could also pay their client (the victim) upfront and, having a vested 
interest in the offender paying, compel them to do so. Alternatively, those unable (or unwilling) 
to acquire crime insurance could be compelled to pay a “crime tax”, serving much the same 
purpose. 
The most immediately apparent benefit which arises from the implementation above is 
the disappearance of the high costs associated with the imprisonment and care of inmates. The 
amount of money the U.S. spends in this area is astronomical- in 2016, the U.S. reported over 
$80 billion in spending, annually, on corrections19; if these costs disappeared, said money could 
be reallocated to be used in more beneficial ways. Furthermore, since the only limitation inherent 
to the exaction of restitution is income, these convicts would be incentivized and motivated to 
find and keep well-paying jobs (assuming they do not already have one). Here, the money saved 
in prison housing might be reallocated to innovate in industry and create jobs, which would 
directly or indirectly (as a result of other people moving into those new positions, creating an 
opening at their previous job) create job opportunities for convicts.  
                                                
19 U.S. Department of Education, “Report: Increases in Spending on Corrections Far Outpace Education.” (2016). 
Patrone 18 
 
There are several objections which must be addressed in this example. First, the potential 
risk for abuse resulting from the lack of public defenders- money being involved, it would be an 
interest of the state (or insurance agency) to return guilty verdicts, correctly so or otherwise. 
Here, it would be beneficial for the litigant to be uninfluenced by their vested interest (if the state 
has been paid a “crime tax”, there should be independent arbitration, or vise-versa). Additionally, 
without public defenders, there is a concern that wrongful convictions would increase drastically. 
Although wrongful convictions are not a large problem for restitution- which is solely concerned 
with returning the victim to the state they rightfully enjoyed previously- it might be beneficial to 
reevaluate the criteria for burden of proof.  
 Perhaps the most damning objection, if left unanswered, is that potentially forwarded 
against the “crime tax”. Critics of the practical implementation of restitution will certainly 
formulate an objection in the same vein as the objection advanced by critics of the Affordable 
Care Act’s “individual mandate”20: Congress cannot implement a tax for economic inactivity- 
Congress cannot tax individuals for choosing not to participate in an optional transaction (having 
insurance). Although this objection seems reasonable at face, it does not stand up to scrutiny. 
Very recently, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed standing precedent, in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), 
that Congress can impose taxes upon economic inactivity, that this tax need not be apportioned 
in accordance with state proportion (of payments) nor population21, and also that this tax need 
not even be characterized as a tax in order to be treated as one: 
The payment is not so high that there is really no choice but to buy health insurance; the 
payment is not limited to willful violations, as penalties for unlawful acts often are; and 
the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation. […]. 
Neither the Affordable Care Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences 
to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. The Affordable 
                                                




Care Act describes the “shared responsibility payment” as a “penalty,” not a “tax.” […]. 
In answering that constitutional question, this Court follows a functional approach, 
“disregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and 
application.”22 
This is an appropriate example for several reasons- first and foremost, it is a real-world 
implementation of a tax upon an optional economic transaction (buying health insurance), within 
the same industry as the potential “crime tax”, but also leaves open for discussion the appropriate 
state apportionment for the distribution of these funds. Law enforcement in states with low rates 
of crime might receive a smaller amount of the tax collected than states/regions where crime is a 
more substantial issue, the specifics, however, are unimportant to this discussion. 
Lastly, it will be beneficial to consider the current standards for “burden of proof.” 
Presently, criminal and civil suits employ independent standards which dictate, in part, which 
Constitutional rights are guaranteed to the respondent in court. Criminal courts implement a 
burden of proof known as “beyond reasonable doubt”, which is favorable to the accused insofar 
as allegations which may be reasonably doubted fail to result in convictions. This is the highest 
burden of proof, and is necessary in current criminal proceedings plainly because the accused 
stands to lose everything- potentially even his life. Civil courts implement a standard known as 
“preponderance of evidence”, which is indicative of a probabilistic- more likely than not- 
determination of guilt and culpability, in consideration of the evidence. With nothing but money 
potentially at stake in civil court, citizens do not enjoy the right to public counsel; the respondent 
does not face the possibility of imprisonment or execution, so it is acceptable that they might not 
receive adequate defense. Wealth and earning in America are already far from absolute- we are 
subject to taxes and fines, and restitution- whether civil or criminal- needn’t be any different. 
Considering there is less at stake in the paradigm of restitution, it would certainly be reasonable 
                                                
22 Ibid, §4(a). 
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to lower the burden of proof accordingly. Paired together, the abolition of public defense and a 
lower burden of proof are indicative of no problem for the implementation of restitution, and 
perhaps illustrate yet another superiority of restitution, in its simplicity and fiscal responsibility, 
whilst achieving goals equivalent to those of the paradigm of punishment. 
VII. The Crux of Restitution in Practice 
I have demonstrated that Boonin’s theory of pure restitution is theoretically sound and 
defended an instance of its implementation as practical. However, the replacement of punishment 
with restitution has not yet been demonstrated compatible with the supreme law of the land- the 
Constitution. If restitution is in conflict with the Constitution, it cannot be said to be practically 
implementable presently; I recognize that it is possible to amend the Constitution, though the 
infrequency with which it has been done, as a result of the difficulties involved in doing so, 
indicates the high unlikeliness of such an amendment. Consequently, if restitution cannot be 
demonstrated as presently compatible with the Constitution, my thesis should be rejected. I will 
begin by discussing Constitutional provisions and case-law relevant to the imposition of 
restitution, the categorization of restitution as non-punitive, as well as the method of calculation 
used to determine the appropriate amount of restitution in any given case. 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S Constitution states, plainly, that no state23 shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.24 It is reasonably 
clear that these passages are not endorsements of, nor expressions alluding to an endorsement of, 
any particular paradigm of criminal justice. However, it is important to note that these passages 
are often cited as indicative of the permissibility of punishment. While it is certainly true that the 
                                                
23 The Fifth Amendment contains the same provision, as applicable to the federal government.  
24 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
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Fourteenth Amendment enumerates the condition necessary for an individual to be deprived of 
“life, liberty or property”, the deprivation itself is not necessary. Bluntly, there is no 
Constitutional obligation to deprive anyone of life, liberty, nor property. As obvious as this fact 
is, it levels the Constitutional permissibility of restitution with more traditional punishment. 
Although neither punishment nor restitution receives an endorsement of superiority from the 
Constitution, both are recognized as- at the very least- potentially legitimate. 
 As bland as the discussion of the Constitutionality of restitution has been thus far, its 
importance cannot be overstated- if restitution were incompatible with the Constitution, there 
would be no point in considering its applicability. The demonstrability that the transition from 
punishment to restitution would require no significant shifts in the function of the Constitution 
makes the paradigm of pure restitution far more practically appealing. 
At this point, I will discuss the current situation of restitution in the American Criminal 
Justice System. The most recent legal precedent of relevance to this discussion comes from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit in the case United States v. Serawop (2007): Redd Rock 
Serawop, an American Indian convicted of one count of voluntary manslaughter, challenged a 
court order to pay $325,750- the calculated expected lifetime “lost-income” of the victim- in 
accordance with the “Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act”25, to the estate of said victim- 
Beyoncé Serawop (his three-month-old daughter).26 In affirming the lower court’s decision 
requiring Serawop to pay the originally ordered restitution, the court referenced U.S. v. 
                                                
25 Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act, U.S. Code 18 (1996), § 3663A. 
26 United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (2007). 
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Cienfuegos (2006), which asserted that “it would be illogical to assume that the ultimate death of 
a person who suffered bodily injury eliminates restitution for lost income”.27  
Although the decision in Serawop does not reference anything except lost income, it does 
cite the merit inherent to the method of calculating lost income:  
the district court did not base its conclusions on sheer speculation and hypothesis; rather 
it relied on well-recognized industry standards and norms. “We have recognized that the 
determination of an appropriate restitution amount is an inexact science.” […]. While 
calculations of future lost income must be based upon certain economic assumptions, the 
concepts and analysis involved are well-developed in federal law…28 
 It seems entirely feasible to apply a similar method of calculation to more “Booninian” 
concepts of harms and losses (i.e. emotional/psychological harms). Furthermore, the Serawop 
decision seems to respond to a common and flippant practical objection to Boonin: “you cannot 
simply plug someone into a formula and determine the appropriate amount of restitution.” On the 
contrary, the Serawop decision indicates that this is precisely what we can (and should) do. This 
also highlights the lack of necessity for restitution to go to the victim whilst remaining 
legitimate, by drawing further from Cienfuegos: “it is plain that the statute allows a 
representative of the victim’s estate or another family member to assume the victim’s rights to 
collect restitution for future lost income”.29 The possibility for family members, etc. to collect 
restitution for future lost income indicates no incompatibility with the collection of restitution of 
other varieties (i.e. psychological damage). Although restitution is not used as an alternative to 
punishment in the American Criminal Justice System, the judiciary has characterized the primary 
function of restitution as such, which bares strong resemblance to Boonin’s interpretation: 30 
                                                
27 United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1164 (2006). Qtd. in U.S. v. Serawop. 
28 United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (2007). 
29 Ibid. Qtd. in U.S. v. Serawop. 
30 See §II. 
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The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of criminal 
justice, of every culture and every time. It holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power 
of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure that the wrongdoer is 
required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-
being.31 
In its final characterization, the Tenth Circuit- in Serawop- asserted that the “statutory focus” of 
the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (MVRA) is “upon making victims whole”32, and 
furthermore, that restitution is not criminal punishment.33 
 The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, that restitution is not punitive (nor, by extension, 
punishment) hardly comes as a surprise. However, the likeness of the court’s reasoning to 
Boonin’s, including the near-identical statement of purpose (of restitution)- which is largely 
uninterested in the offender- is fairly reassuring of restitution’s potential utilization in the U.S. It 
is safe to conclude from this discussion of relevant case law and precedent, I think, that 
restitution is applicable as an alternative paradigm of criminal justice. Although it may still face 
many practical problems of implementation, restitution is already a cornerstone of American 
criminal justice, and will remain so no matter which paradigm of criminal justice the U.S. 
endorses.  
IX. Conclusion 
 The United States’ Criminal Justice System does not need punishment; whether David 
Boonin’s formulation of pure restitution is the most appropriate alternative, I cannot say. 
Punishment’s reliance upon the nature of the difference between two groups as justification for 
treating one in a way that would be objectionable to treat the other has been assessed and used to 
attack the moral permissibility of punishment. However, I have demonstrated the offerings- to 
                                                
31 United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112 (2007), §II C 2, para. 4. 
32 United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 253 (2002). Qtd. in U.S. v. Serawop. 
33 United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316. Qtd. in U.S. v. Serawop. 
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both the victim and offender- of pure restitution to be superior to those of punishment, the 
offerings of which are non-existent for the victim and offender alike (in punishment). Those 
common objections to the theory of pure restitution, as the “irreparable harms” and “third party 
victims” objections, fail to defeat restitution on account of punishment’s failure to do any better34 
and a misrepresentation of a key concept respectively.35 Additionally, I have illustrated the 
practical benefits and detriments of the implementation of restitution, the benefits of which 
heavily outweigh the costs. Furthermore, I have demonstrated restitution- as a paradigm of 
criminal justice- to be compatible with the U.S. Constitution by evaluating the relevant case-law 
precedent, as well as the court’s attitude toward restitution as an institution.  
I recognize that there is a far greater scope of justifications for punishment as a paradigm 
of criminal punishment than those discussed in the confines of this paper. Arguments are readily 
advanceable by appealing to the retributivist theory of justice, or contrarily, focusing on 
deterrence (though evidence of deterrence as a result of the threat of (generally, capital) 
punishment in the American criminal justice system is largely inconclusive). However, 
regardless of the strength of any external justification of punishment, this paper’s examination of 
the moral implications is sufficient, I suggest, to assert that any such justification must willingly 
accept the moral impermissibility of punishment; as a result, advocates of punishment might no 
longer enjoy the ability to claim that punishment is “the right thing” or any similar notion.  
As with many instances of change, the greatest weakness to the implementation of 
restitution is cultural fear of change. Still today, as more and more Americans recognize the 
seriousness of many problems inherent to punishment, attempts are made to fix punishment; I 
suggest, as apparent from the consideration of punishment in the body above, that punishment is 
                                                
34 See §IV. Punishment also fails to repair those harms which restitution cannot. 
35 See §V. 
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fundamentally unfixable. However, it is hopeful that a realization that the paradigm of criminal 
justice in America must change will be accompanied by a willingness to shift away from those 
values that punishment encompasses. It is not entirely clear that Boonin’s pure restitution harbors 
the values instantiated by our growing skepticism of the current criminal justice paradigm, but it 
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